Stardate 20030909.1323

(On Screen): Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz stated that the government of Israel should exile Arafat, before the end of the year. Since his HQ was trashed in the spring of 2002, Arafat has been "trapped" in that area. It's not that he's being kept confined there, but rather that he knows full well that if he leaves, he won't be permitted to return. He can travel to Gaza if he wants, and he can travel to Cairo, but wherever he goes, he won't be coming back. So he remains in the ruins of his HQ, living in a building which was partially destroyed.

The Israeli government hoped, I think, that he would eventually decide to travel. It would be politically easier for them to have him leave and not let him return than to forcibly exile him, but he hasn't taken the bait. Now Mofaz thinks they really should force him out.

A few days later, Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said the same thing. In response, Condi Rice said that "no good would be served" by forcing Arafat into exile. I don't agree. I think that a lot would be gained, both in the short term and in the long run. Having him be dead would be even better, but it isn't politically possible for Israel to send troops in to take Arafat away, for a private execution.

Which is unfortunately, because with Arafat in exile, it becomes something that can be used against Israel by its enemies. But if he was out of the country, it would be far more difficult for him to continue to pull the strings of power in the Palestinian Authority, and of necessity he'd have to give more power to others, or have it taken from him anyway.

"President" Arafat was "elected" in a process which was far from honest, and in any case his election was seven years ago. If he were actually anything like a leader of a democracy, he'd have submitted himself to new elections long since. He's promised to do so a couple of times, but there always ended up being some reason or other why the elections had to be cancelled. Usually he found some way to blame the Israelis, but the truth is that he doesn't want another election because he doesn't think there needs to be one.

He's a dictator, who has been trying to get a nation to be dictator of. And he has never given up his ambition of taking back all of Palestine, right up to water's edge.

He'd like to take it sooner, if he could, but in the long run the only thing he really needs is for there to be a diplomatic solution which fully implements the "right of return". Douglas Davis writes:

The reason the Palestinians have not run with the ball is that they are convinced that they have far more to gain by playing for time. On present trends, say the demographers, Palestinians will outnumber Jews in the area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River — Israel, the West Bank and Gaza — by 2020. At that point, Israel will cease to exist as a democratic and Jewish state.

Why accept a truncated two-state solution in the West Bank and Gaza when the one-state solution down the road will deliver Israel, too? Not by suicide bombers or conventional military means, but by the simple expedient of eroding Israel’s Jewish majority. All the Palestinians have to do is breed for victory: make love, not war, and transform their womenfolk into what Arafat calls his ‘biological bombs’.

That's why the "right of return" has always been the key point in the negotiations. In some kinds of negotiations there is common ground in the middle, where each side can make compromises and thus meet halfway. But on some issues there is no common ground, and before there can be an agreement one side has to concede the issue entirely.

The "right of return" is now and has always been that kind of issue. It's the one concession Israel can never make, and will never make. But that's because the "right of return" is an indicator of something deeper, and both sides know it. On this rests the entire question of Israel's long term existence. The Palestinians can only give up the "right of return" if they come to accept that they will never actually reoccupy the territory of Israel.

Daniel Pipes writes a retrospective of the Oslo accords, ten years on, and asks the rhetorical question, What went wrong?

Many things, but most important was that the deal rested on a faulty Israeli premise that Palestinians had given up their hope of destroying the Jewish state. This led to the expectation that if Israel offered sufficient financial and political incentives, the Palestinians would formally recognize the Jewish state and close down the conflict.

Israelis therefore pushed themselves to make an array of concessions, in the futile hope that flexibility, restraint and generosity would win Palestinian goodwill. In fact, these steps made matters worse by sending signals of apparent demoralization and weakness. Each concession further reduced Palestinian awe of Israeli might, made Israel seem more vulnerable and incited irredentist dreams of annihilating it.

Thus the "Road Map to Peace" which was widely misunderstood, often deliberately. The main real purpose of the first phase of the roadmap was to force Arafat to give up power. Most of the deliverables in the First Phase were Palestinian reforms. There had to be real and honest elections, creation of a new Palestinian government, elimination of corruption, and a serious attempt to stop the extremists. And all of this would be judged on the basis of results, not on the basis of pious promises, and the second phase of the roadmap would begin upon completion of the first phase, no matter how long that took. There was a schedule in the Road Map, but it was intended to represent what was thought to be possible if the Palestinians actually took the process seriously.

The entire point of the Road Map was that Arafat had proved himself untrustworthy. He had shown that he either could not or would not deliver what he promised. Thus the point of the Road Map was that only Palestinian accomplishments would be rewarded, and they had to deliver first.

In June of 2002, President Bush made a speech in which he announced a new American doctrine towards the Palestinians. It changed everything, and the first stage of the Road Map was consistent with it. He offered the Palestinians an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, but before that could happen, he insisted on fundamental reform. Part of that was a refusal thereafter to deal with Arafat or with anyone viewed as being a direct representative of Arafat.

That's remained our policy since, and Israel has adopted approximately the same policy. The demand for appointment of a Prime Minister was part of that, and part of that demand was that Arafat turn over real power to that Prime Minister. The real goal of it all was to try to arrange a peaceful transition of power away from Arafat.

I think Abbas understood the situation even before he took the position, but if not I'm sure he got it explained to him. But there was probably no solution for him. Arafat certainly understood the situation, and wanted to try to make the Palestinian PM a puppet, with Abbas' face but Arafat's voice. I think that had to fail once, to make clear to Arafat that we aren't interested in symbolic gestures.

What this is about is changing the Palestinians themselves. I think that this attempt, with the first Prime Minister, was better than anything which had come before, but it failed because Arafat ultimately refused to give up. Arafat's first goal is to stay in power, no matter what.

The "road map" isn't important, as such. What's important is the recognition that there cannot be peace between the Palestinians and Israelis until the Palestinians truly give up on the idea of the destruction of Israel, whether short term or long term.

They have to clean up their own act. They have to institute something akin to honest government, and they have to prove their commitment by themselves seriously working to eliminate such groups as Hamas. None of that can happen as long as Arafat is around.

He'll die, eventually. It could be soon, but it could be a long time from now. As long as he's alive, nothing will change if he is in a position to be able to influence the course of events. He cares nothing for peace.

If another Prime Minister is appointed and forms a cabinet, and then Arafat is exiled, then as a practical matter the new Prime Minister will have far more control than Abbas ever did. I think Abbas was genuinely trying to work things out, and the next PM might not be willing to do so. But such a leader would not have the kind of grip on power that Arafat has, and would in turn be easier to replace.

Doing this might result in chaos. But nothing can improve the situation in the short term, and doing so might give some real hope of long term improvement.

Alive or dead, in exile or not, Arafat's shadow will darken the situation for years in any case. In all scenarios he complicates things. But once he loses control, his shadow will darken the situation less and less. If he's exiled now, then there may be a chance of peace in five years.

Update: Terra Taco comments.

Update 20030910: The Ministry of minor perfidy comments.
Former Belgian comments.

Update: The Jerusalem Post advocates killing Arafat.
Bill Quick thinks so, too.

My new blog: Chizumatic